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NOTES AND COMMENTS*
Administrative Law-Announcement of Policy as Constituting
Order Subject to Judicial Review
Through its contracts with 115 affiliated radio stations, the Columbia
Broadcasting System maintains the national network organization nec-
essary to secure advertising revenues. Following a prolonged investiga-
tion the Federal Communications Commission concluded that certain
provisions of these contracts were unduly restrictive of competition.
Accordingly, an order was issued giving expression, in the form of
"chain broadcasting regulations," to the general policy which the Com-
mission would follow in future licensing of broadcasting stations. The
regulations provided that no license should be granted to a station whose
contract with a network system contained any of the prohibited arrange-
ments. Immediately many of the local affiliates announced their inten-
tion to cancel, modify, or refuse to renew their existing contracts.
CBS brought suit under the Communications Act of 1934 and the
Urgent Deficiencies Act1 to enjoin enforcement of the FCC's order as
beyond the Commission's statutory and constitutional authority and
contrary to public policy. The special three-judge district court dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, 2 but upon direct appeal to the Supreme
Court the lower court was reversed and the case remanded for trial
on the merits.3 By a five to three decision the Court held the order re-
viewable because it promulgated regulations controlling the contractual
relationships of the stations and the networks, thereby immediately and
adversely affecting the rights of the appellant, and subjecting the sta-
tions to a drastic penalty for non-compliance-denial or cancellation of
broadcasting licenses.
Several aspects of the broad problem of judicial review of admin-
istrative orders are not under consideration here. Under the doctrine
of "primary jurisdiction" courts refuse to deal with technical questions
* Footnotes which contain material other than a mere listing of sources and
authorities are indicated throughout this REvIEw by an asterisk placed after the
footnote number.
'§402(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S.
C. A. §402(a) (Supp. 1941), makes applicable to "suits to enforce, enjoin, set
aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission" (with the exception of
orders granting or denying construction permits and radio station licenses) the
provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act outlining the procedure for review of
ICC orders. 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §46 (1934).
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
' Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct.
1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066 (1942). National Broadcasting Company v.
United States, - U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1214, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1088 (1942), is
a companion case.
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until they have been submitted to the specialized administrative body
designed for expertness in handling such problems. 4 Administrative
remedies must be exhausted before the case can be taken to the courts.5
For example, judicial review has been denied where there was no appli-
cation for a rehearing before the administrative tribunal,0 and in some
cases where appeal to a higher governmental agency has been provided,
such appeal has been held a prerequisite to judicial consideration.7
Suits to set aside or modify administrative orders may be maintained
only by aggrieved or interested parties,8 and these actions are bften
limited to 'definite statutory procedures." These problems, and the
crucial issue of the conclusiveness of administrative determinations
(the doctrine of administrative finality), may be differentiated from
the first essential of appeal from administrative action, the requirement
illustrated in the principal case, -namely, that there be an "order" hav-
ing a degree of finality and determining or affecting the legal rights,
duties and responsibilities of the appellant.
"The word 'order' is used for an executive act, for a judicial act,
'Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51
L. ed. 553 (1907) ; Miller, The Necessity for Preliminary Resort to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1932) 1 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 49; Tollefson, Judicial
Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1937) 5 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 503, 531; Note (1938) 51 H.Av. L. REv. 1251.
'Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 981;
Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Admin-
istrative Remedies (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rv. 637; Notes (1935) 35 COL. L. Rv.
230, (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 450.
'Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. (2d) 282 (App. D. C. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 625, 59 S. Ct. 86, 83 L. ed. 400 (1938) ; Note (1939) 27
GEo. L. J. 783.
'Porter v. Investor's Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617, 76 L. ed. 1226(1931) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. ed.
150 (1908) ; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 24 S. Ct. 621, 48 L. ed.
'917 (1904); §313(a) of the Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S.
C. A. §8251(a) (1941).
'FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 60 S. Ct. 693, 84 L. ed.
869 (1940); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382; 52
S. Ct. 440, 76 L. ed. 808 (1932) ; Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281
U. S. 249, 50 S. Ct. 315, 74 L. ed. 832 (1930) ; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S.
258, 44 S. Ct. 317, 68 L. ed. 667 (1924) ; Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v.
United States, 263 U. S. 143, 44 S. Ct. 72, 68 L. ed. 216 (1923).
"The two most common methods of review found in Congressional acts are(1) an equitable proceeding to enjoin or set aside the order, brought in a special
district court of three judges, with direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court,
and precedence over other cases in both courts (the procedure provided by the
Urgent Deficiencies Act) ; (2) an appeal to a circuit court of appeals by the com-
mission to enforce, or by an interested party to set aside, a cease and desist order
of the commission, with review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.
McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders (1940)
28 CAsIFn. L. Rlv. 129, 130. For cases denying relief because the wrong procedure
was followed, see Venner v. Michigan C. R. R., 271 U. S. 127, 46 St. Ct. 444,
70 L. ed. 868 (1926); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. L, 258 U. S.
377, 42 S. Ct. 349, 66 L. ed. 671 (1922) ; United States v. Merchants and Man-
ufacturers' Traffic Ass'n, 242 U. S. 178, 37 S. Ct. 24, 61 L. ed. 233 (1916).
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and for a legislative act. . ."10 There is nothing in the usage of the
term which clarifies the problem of what acts are "orders" and there-
fore reviewable. Nor have the statutes creating administrative boards
and establishing their relationship to the judiciary attempted any more
accurate definition or classification. 1 Consequently, courts have been
relatively free to block out the kind of determinations properly called
"orders" and to place limitations on the appealability of these orders.12
An "order" in the form of an unequivocal command is often re-
quired as a condition precedent to judicial review. Although this
condition has not been universally demanded, 13 it does explain why
administrative determinations in the nature of findings of fact embodied
in reports and orders are not subject to attack as such. 14" This is true
whether the findings are the last contemplated action in the proceedings
or whether they are to be the basis for future administrative adjudica-
tion or regulation; standing alone they are not enforceable and seldom
have any immediate legal effects. United States v. Los Angeles &
Salt Lake Railroad Company,'5 relied on by Justice Frankfurter in his
10 Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report (Cmd. 4060, London, 1932) 18.
"' For a thorough classification, see Blachly and Oatman, Federal Statutory
Administrative Orders (1940) 25 IowA L. Rav. 582.
12Note, Appealability of Administrative Orders (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766,
768. This comment contains an excellent discussion of the general problem under
consideration.1 Note (1940) 8 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 113, 114.
4* United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. R., 282 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 237, 75
L. ed. 513 (1931) (in report on carrier's accounts, ICC concluded that investment
figure should not exceed stated sum and "expected" company to adjust accounts
accordingly; held, no "order") ; Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Comm.,
97 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (no review of finding that interstate or
foreign commerce would be affected by proposed construction of hydro-electric
power project, even though after such finding construction of the project would
violate the Federal Power Act and could be enjoined at the suit of the Commis-
sion); Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (carrier
asked SEC to amend requirements as to filing financial statements, and was noti-
fied by letter that its petition was denied; the court dismissed the statutory
appeal) ; Brady v. ICC, 43 F. (2d) 847 (N. D. W. Va. 1930), aff'd, 283 U. S.
804, 51 S. Ct. 559, 75 L. ed. 1424 (1931) (suit to set aside reparation order held
not maintainable under Urgent Deficiencies Act because suit was actually one to
correct alleged errors in ICC's findings on which the order was based) ; Brooklyn
E. Distr. Terminal v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 634 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) (general
order of ICC required common carriers to report excess income and pay half to
the Commission; the Commission declared petitioner a common carrier and by
letters "requested" payment; held, no appealable order) ; cf. Great N. Ry. v.
United States, 277 U. S. 172, 48 S. Ct. 466, 72 L. ed. 838 (1928) (no appeal
from certification by ICC of amount due carrier under government guaranty).
See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Merriam & Millard Co., 297 Fed. 1 (C. C A.
8th, 1924) (ICC report that certain rates would be unreasonable for the future
and that reductions by the railroads should be forthcoming was held ineffectual
to change existing filed tariffs); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. R., 207 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1913) (without formal order the
ICC declared that allowances given by carriers were unlawful rebates and an-
nounced that carriers were expected to revise tariffs in conformity with the
declaration; held ICC's action does not constitute a legally significant order).
1 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413, 71 L. ed. 651 (1927). Accord, United States
[Vol. 21
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dissenting opinion in the instant case, presents a typical application
of this rule. Under the authority of the Valuation Act,1 6 the Interstate
Commerce Commission established a final value of the railroad's prop-
erty. This valuation was for possible future use by the Commission in
any of a number of regulatory activities, notably rate making. In a
suit to set aside the ICC's order fixing the value it was held that the
order was not reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. It did not
command, nor did it determine any legal right; and since under the
Act it was only prima facie evidence of the legal value, it could be re-
examined in any later judicial proceedings involving the valuation.17*
Similar to these "non-orders" are jurisdictional findings of boards
and commissions. Such agencies must necessarily make the initial
determination of whether individuals and corporations are subject to
the provisions of the statutes sought to be enforced or whether they
fall within exemptions or exceptions. Efforts to attain immediate court
review of these decisions have generally been unsuccessful, even though
direct and serious injury threatens. This is one aspect of the "final
order rule,"' 8 the doctrine which denies appeals until the final stage
of the administrative process has been reached.19 A determination
that a carrier is not an interurban electric railway within an exception
to the Railway Labor Act,20 or the Interstate Commerce Act ;21- that
v. Kansas City S. Ry., 275 U. S. 500, 48 S. Ct. 140, 72 L. ed. 394 (1927). Contra:
Potomac Edison Co. v. West, 165 Md. 462, 169 Atl. 480 (1933). In Delaware &
Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 S. Ct. 153, 69 L. ed. 369 (1925),
a suit to annul a tentative valuation of railroad property was dismissed because
the administrative process had not been completed, the administrative remedy
exhausted.
1637 STAT. 701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. A. §19a (1934).
""The following language of Justice Brandeis, distinguishing this order from
quasi-judicial and legislative orders of administrative agencies, was quoted in the
dissenting opinion of the principal case: "The so-called order . . . is one which
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing anything; which
does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; . . . extend or
abridge any power or facility; . . . subject the carrier to any liability, civil or
criminal; . . . change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; . . .
determine any right or obligation. . . . It is the exercise solely of the function
of investigation . . . merely preparation for possible action in some proceeding
which may be instituted in the future- ... ." United States v. Los Angeles &
S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 309, 47 S. Ct. 413, 414, 71 L. ed. 651, 655 (1927).
18 Note (1940) 8 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 113.
' Of course, all intermediate determinations may be questioned when the final
order is attacked. For example, United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105, 56 S. Ct.
690, 80 L. ed. 1070 (1936). When the ICC, after deciding that a railroad line
was not a spur track outside the Commission's statutory jurisdiction, authorized
abandonment of the line, the State of Idaho sued under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act, contending that the line vas a spur and the ICC's authorization of abandon-
ment ineffective. Held, the line is a spur track wholly within one state and Com-
mission's order is annulled.
20* §1 of the Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §151
(Supp. 1941), authorizes and directs the ICC, upon request of the National Media-
tion Board or any interested party, to determine whether an electric railway falls
1942]
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the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193522 applies to a cor-
poration seeking exemption ;28 that a distributor is a "natural gas com-
pany" under the Natural Gas Act ;24 or that an employer is engaged
in interstate commerce and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board25-these are not appealable orders.
But in a recent case the Supreme Court held reviewable an FCC
ruling that a telephone company was a common carrier within the
Communications Act of 1934,26 and therefore subject to pasLorders of
the Commission relating to telephone companies.2 7  The distinction
between this case and others which involve jurisdictional determina-
within the exception. Pursuant to this provision and at the request of the Media-
tion Board the Commission found that a carrier was not an interurban electric
railway. Held, the finding is not an order reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act because it is not in the form of an order, it does not command or direct any
action but is simply preparation for possible future intervention in case of a labor
dispute. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596, 58 S. Ct. 732, 82 L. ed. 1039
(1938). The Court expressly declined to consider whether the ICC's determina-
tion was reviewable by some procedure other than that of the Urgent Deficiencies
Act. In Shields v. Utah Idaho C. R. R., 305 U. S. 177, 59 S. Ct. 160, 83 L. ed.
111 (1938) one method of appeal was approved. After the ICC found the rail-
road within the scope of the Act and the National Mediation Board ordered the
posting of a notice, the carrier brought suit against the federal district attorney
to restrain any prosecution for failure to publish the notice or for any other
violation of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's assumption
of jurisdiction. Other examples of review by this method: Texas Electric Ry.
v. Eastus, 25 F. Supp. 825 (N. D. Tex. 1938), aff'd, 308 U. S. 512, 60 S. Ct.
134, 84 L. ed. 437 (1939), and Hudson & Manhattan R. R. v. Hardy, 22 F. Supp.
105 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), rev'd on merits, 103 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. Zd, 1939).
2  Piedmont & N. Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct. 192, 74 L. ed.
551 (1930). The ICC decided that the carrier was not exempt from the Act
and that public convenience and necessity did not permit a proposed extension of
the railway's lines. The carrier sued to set aside the order denying exemption;
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
saying that the ICCs negative order was not res judicata of the company's claim
of immunity, and that the risk of loss to the carrier if it constructed the line
without a certificate arose from the statute, not from the order. The validity of
the ICC's determination of the railway's status was later tested and sustalped by
a suit to enjoin the construction of the new line until a certificate should be ob-
tained. Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U. S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 541, 76 L. ed. 1115
(1932). United States v. Chicago, N. S. & M. R. R., 288 U. S. 1, 53 S. Ct. 245,
77 L. ed. 583 (1933) was a proceeding to enjoin the carrier from issuing securities
without ICC approval. The district court and the Supreme Court declared the
railroad within the exemption to the Act, pointing out that the Commission had
for over a decade treated the carrier as an interurban electric railway outside
its jurisdiction.
2149 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79 et seq. (Supp. 1941).
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. SEC, 100 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
2 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 115 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940) ; Canadian River Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 110 F. (2d) 350
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
" See Newport News S. & D. D. Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54, 57, 58 S. Ct.
466, 467, 82 L. ed. 646, 648, 649 (1938).
2
" §2(b) (2) of the Act, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. 152(b) (2)
(Supp. 1941); §3(h), 48 STAT. 1065 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §153(h) (Supp.
1941).
27 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754,
83 L. ed. 1147 (1939).
[Vol. 21
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tions is found in the opinion by Justice Frankfurter: "The order . ; .
was not a mere abstract declaration regarding the status of the Roches-
ter.... [It] necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience
to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all
carriers amenable to the Commission's authority." 28-
There is a stronger reason, however, for the importance of the
Rochester Telephone Corp. case in the field of administrative law. In
it the Supreme Court repudiated the "negative order doctrine." A
long line of decisions in suits under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to set
aside ICC orders had established the questionable proposition that the
federal courts had no jurisdiction to review orders denying the affirm-
ative relief sought.29 When re-examined by the Court the cases failed
to sustain the utility and wisdom of the doctrine and they were over-
28 Id. at 143, 144, 59 S. Ct. at 764, 83 L. ed. at 1160. A case somewhat
resembling the Rochester Telephone Corp. case is Charles Noeding Trucking Co.
v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 537 (D. N. J. 1939). §203(b) (8) of the Motor
Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §303(b) (8) (Supp. 1941),
grants to carriers within municipalities, between contiguous municipalities, or within
commercial zones adjacent to municipalities a partial exemption from the pro-
visions of the Act, but the ICC may withdraw the exemption and apply the full
Act when necessary to carry out the national transportation policy. The Com-
mission defined the New York City commercial zone, excluding and withdrawing
from the zone certain contiguous municipalities, thus subjecting carriers in those
areas to the regulatory weight of the Act, backed up by penal provisions. On
attack by the carriers the ICC's determination was held a "final order" reviewable
under the terms of the Act; the order ended the proceeding before the ICC and
imposed duties on the plaintiffs which carried sanctions for non-compliance.
"Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761, 56
L. ed. 1091 (1912) (refusal of relief against demurrage regulations); Hooker v.
Knapp, 225 U. S. 302, 32 S. Ct. 769, 56 L. ed. 1099 (1912) (refusal to reduce
maximum rates) ; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412, 37 S. Ct.
397, 61 L. ed. 819 (1917) (denial of relief from Panama Canal Act) ; Manufac-
turers Ry. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 38 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. ed. 831 (1918)
(failure to fix divisions of joint rates); Piedmont & N. Ry. v. United States,
280 U. S. 469, 50 S. Ct. 192, 74 L. ed. 551 (1930) (assumption of jurisdiction
and denial of certificate of convenience and necessity); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S. 235, 51 S. Ct. 429, 75 L. ed. 999 (1931) (denial of relief
against alleged overcharges) ; ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U. S. 385,
53 S. Ct. 607, 77 L. ed. 1273 (1933) (refusal to award damages in reparations
case); United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 56 S. Ct. 829, 80 L. ed. 1263(1936) (refusal to file tariff schedule) ; United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226,
58 S. Ct. 601, 82 L. ed. 764 (1938) (refusal upon re-examination to increase
railroad's compensation for carrying the mail). But cf. holding order review-
able: Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 S. Ct. 986, 58 L. ed. 1408
(1914) (partial denial of permission to depart from the short and long haul
clause of the Interstate Commerce Act); United States v. New River Co., 265
U. S. 533, 44 S. Ct. 610, 68 L. ed. 1165 (1924) (dismissal of complaints against
rule of coal car distribution); Alton R. R. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229, 53
S. Ct. 124, 77 L. ed. 275 (1932) (refusal to change divisions of joint reshipping
rates); Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 5(/ S. Ct. 470, 81 L. ed. 643
(1937) (order striking tariff from files). On the negative order doctrine and its
abolition in the Rochester Telephone Corp. case, see Notes (1934) 34 COL. L. REv.
908, (1939) 15 IND. L. J. 151, (1940)" 24 MiNN. L. REv. 379, (1939) 6 U. OF
CHr. L. REv. 277, (1939) 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 591; (1933) 1 GEo. WAsH. L.
Rav. 276.
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ruled. The combined doctrines of "primary jurisdiction" and "admin-
istrative finality" were left to effectuate the considerations of policy
behind the abandoned negative order rule. 0
In contrast to administrative -determinations which are not enforce-
able and which do not give rise to a clash of interest between a com-
plainant and a governmental agency are regulations which are the end
results of a commission's investigation and which formulate definite
rules of conduct, enforceable by the imposition of statutory penalties.
Thus a person aggrieved by a rate order,3 ' a rule of car distribution in
times of shortage,32 an order promulgating rules governing car-hire
settlements,83 a mandate compelling the adoption of a safety device, 4
or an order prescribing the form and classification of accounts8 5 may
bring an action to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend the order. These
regulations may adversely affect rights as clearly as the acts of a legis-
lature. Since suits to enjoin the enforcement of statutes have been
Completing the repudiation of the negative order doctrine are two cases
decided at the same term. In United States v. Maher, 307 U. S. 148, 59 S. Ct.
768, 83 L. ed. 1162 (1939), the Supreme Court reviewed an order of the ICC
denying an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity under the
"grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S.
C. A. §306(a) (Supp. 1941). In Federal Power Comm. v. Pacific Power &
Light Co., 307 U. S. 156, 59 S. Ct. 766, 83 L. ed. 1180 (1939), denial of an
application for transfer of a utility's assets was appealed by the procedure out-
lined in §313(b) of the Federal Power Act. 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A.
§8251(b) (1941), and the Court sustained the lower court's assumption of juris-
diction. This decision in effect overrules Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal
Power Comm., 97 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"1Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426, 56 S. Ct. 824, 80 L. ed. 1257 (1936);
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed.
524 (1930); United States v. Illinois C. R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 44 S. Ct. 189, 68
L. ed. 417 (1924) ; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 34 S. Ct. 986, 58 L.
ed. 1408 (1914); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 232 U. S. 199, 34
S. Ct. 291, 58 L. ed. 568 (1914) ; ICC v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 32
S. Ct. 108, 56 L. ed. 308 (1912); McLean Lumber Co., v. United States, 237
Fed. 460 (E. D. Tenn. 1916). But cf. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States,
11 F. Supp. 487 (E. D. Va. 1935).
2Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 47 S. Ct. 727, 71 L. ed. 1204 (1927);
ICC v. Illinois C. R. R., 215 U. S. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155, 54 L. ed. 280 (1910); cf.
United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533, 44 S. Ct. 610, 68 L. ed. 1165
(1924).
"Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80, 52 S. Ct. 87, 76
L. ed. 177 (1931).
"United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454, 55 S. Ct. 268, 79 L.
ed. 587 (1935).
" General order: American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299
U. S. 232, 57 S. Ct. 170, 81 L. ed. 142 (1936); Kansas City S. Ry. v. United
States, 231 U. S. 423, 34 S. Ct.- 125, 58 L. ed. 296 (1913); New York Edison
Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. (2d) 277 (1936). Order applicable to
particular company: Atlanta, B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 296 U. S. 33, 56
S. Ct. 12, 80 L. ed. 25 (1935) ; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 287 U. S.
134, 53 S. Ct. 52, 76 L. ed. 218 (1932), aff'g 52 F. (2d) 967 (W. D. Va. 1931) ;
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (D. Va. 1933); Atlanta,
B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 885 (N. D. Ga. 1928).
[Vol. 21
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allowed36 it is reasonable that a commission's quasi-legislation should
be subject to the same attack in the courts.
There are many orders issued by administrative agencies which,
though unequivocal and imperative, are nevertheless non-appealable.
Recognizing the integrity, responsibility and necessities of the "fourth
branch of Government," courts have been reluctant to interfere with
the administrative process by reviewing procedural, interlocutory orders.
Thus when a federal commission orders the institution of an investi-
gation,37 the holding of a hearing,38 or the production of information
and evidence39 the "final order rule" precludes attack until a later
stage in the proceedings has been reached. Similarly, there is no re-
view when the Securities and Exchange Commission refuses permission
to withdraw registration statements,40 nor when the NLRB directs an
election to determine labor representation. 41 Apparently, however, an
administrative agency's disclosure of confidential information in the
initial stages of the price-fixing process may be enjoined in a proper
case.
42 *
The final order doctrine has been specifically incorporated into the
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070
(1925) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. ed. 131 (1915).
"
1 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 115 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940); Canadian River Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 110 F. (2d) 350
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940); SEC v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
"' Newport News S. & D. D. Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54, 58 S. Ct. 466,
82 L. ed. 646 (1938) ; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58
S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. 638 (1938) ; New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. United States, 273
U. S. 652, 47 S. Ct. 334, 71 L. ed. 823 (1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d) 850 (S. D. N. Y.
1926); United States v. Illinois C. R. R., 244 U. S. 82, 37 S. Ct. 584, 61 L. ed.
1007 (1917) ; United States ex rel. Delaware & Hudson R. R. v. ICC, 51 F. (2d)
429 (App. D. C. 1931); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. ICC, 280 Fed. 1014 (App.
D. C. 1922) ; Philadelphia City Passenger Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 271 Pa.
39, 114 Atl. 642 (1921).
" Fedeeal Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct.
963, 82 L. ed. 1408 (1938); Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274
U. S. 160, 47 S. Ct. 553, 71 L. ed. 978 (1927) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Maynard
Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927).
" Resources Corp. International v. SEC, 97 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938);
Jones v. SEC, 79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. dented, 297 U. S. 705,
56 S. Ct. 497, 80 L. ed. 993 (1936).
" NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453, 60 S. Ct. 307, 84 L. ed. 396 (1940);
NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S. 413, 60
S. Ct. 306, 84 L. ed. 354 (1940); Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. NLRB, 73 F.
(2d) 489 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
"* Review of a general order directing the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion was denied where the suit was brought under the statutory procedure. Mal-
lory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 99 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C.
1938). But in Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U. S.
56, 59 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. ed. 483 (1939), the Supreme Court permitted the order
involved in the Mallory case to be tested in a suit to enjoin enforcement; and in
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937)
denial of an application for confidential treatment was held reviewable by the
statutory method because the denial was a final order entered in a particular case.
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National Labor Relations Act by the provision for review of "final
orders" only.43 A certification by the NLRB determining an appro-
priate bargaining unit and designating a particular union as exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit4 4 was held not a final order
and therefore not reviewable in American Federation of Labor v.
NLRB.45 The holding rests squarely on construction of the Act in the
light of its wording and history. The clear Congressional intent to bar
appeals at this interlocutory stage controlled the decision. 46
Obviously, the NLRB's certification may have marked adverse
effects upon the rights and duties of the employer and any labor
minority. In recognizing this aspect of the Board's action the Court
significantly remarked: ". . . we attribute little importance to the fact
that the certification does not itself command action. Administrative
determinations which are not commands may for all practical purposes
determine rights as effectively as the judgment of a court, and may be
re-examined by courts under particular statutes providing for the re-
view of 'orders.' ,7*
The primary requisites of judicial review are present in the principal
case, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States.43 The Su-
preme Court is not deterred by the FCC's characterization of its order as
an announcement of policy.49 The chain broadcasting regulations, while
in form mere rules to guide the Commission in the exercise of its
" §10(f) : "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order
in any circuit court of appeals... ." 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§160(f) (1942).
"' §9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§159 (1942), provides for determination of the appropriate unit and selection of
representatives.
"308 U. S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300, 84 L. ed. 347 (1940).
"Appeal from a similar certification of a state labor relations board has been
denied. Walach's, Inc. v. Boland, 277 N. Y. 345, 14 N. E. (2d) 381 (1938).
"'American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401, 408, 60 S. Ct.
300, 303, 84 L. ed. 347, 352 (1940). The Court declined to decide whether a suit
in equity in a district court to set aside the certification was maintainable. Of
course, the employer can attack the validity of the Board's determination of the
appropriate unit and its designation of the majority union by refusing to bargain;
on appeal from the Board's order to bargain collectively the record of the in-
vestigation is filed and the certification may be questioned and reviewed. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 61 S. Ct. 908, 85 L. ed. 1251
(1941). But if the employer acquiesces in the Board's certification there seems
to be no way in which a minority union can contest it. For comment on American
Federation of Labor v. N.L.R.B., supra, see (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rzv. 1171, (1940)
24 MINN. L. REv. 856, (1939) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Riw. 109.
48 U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066 (1942).
"Jurisdiction to review orders of administrative tribunals is not dependent
on their form. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401, 408,
60 S. Ct. 300, 303, 84 L. ed. 347, 352 (1940) ; Powell v. United States, 300 U. S.
276, 285, 57 S. Ct. 470, 475, 81 L. ed. 643, 650 (1937); Alton R. R. v. United
States, 287 U. S. 229, 237, 53 S. Ct. 124, 127, 77 L. ed. 275, 281 (1932) ; Diamond
Tank Transport v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 497, 499 (W. D. Wash. 1938).
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licensing power, are in effect and intent regulations of the contractual
relations of the national networks and their affiliated stations.50*
Realistically viewed, the order commands the local stations to abrogate
certain provisions of their contracts or else suffer economic death
through loss of station licenses. Of course, this severe penalty will not
be imposed if the stations can prove that the FCC's expressed concept
of the public convenience, interest and necessity in chain broadcasting
is an erroneous one and the regulations therefore void. But any inter-
ested party would have the same opportunity to avoid the fines levied
for disobedience of FCC accounting regulations, or other general orders
which are clearly reviewable. There is no essential difference between
the order in the principal case and other legislative orders reviewable
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act.5 ' In all these cases the alternatives
are to conform to the regulation, to attack it before its direct applica-
tion to the particular litigant, or to violate it and then defend in the
proceedings brought to attach its sanctions. And there is no question
but that the appellant here is an aggrieved party with standing to assail
the order as an illegal exercise of the Commission's rule-making
power.52
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, the order adversely
affects the substantive rights of CBS, not contingently upon future
administrative action as in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake
Railroad Company,53 but immediately, as the threatened cancellations
of contracts attest. The FCC has decided that the contract provisions
are contrary to the public interest. It has issued an order which em-
o* This is shown in several ways. In the first place, the FCC's investigation
was begun under §303(i) of the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47
U. S. C. A. §303(i) (Supp. 1941), which gives the Commission authority "to
make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcast-
ing." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, - U. S. -, 62 S.
Ct. 1194, 1200, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1066, 1072 (1942). Secondly, the Com-
mission twice provided for postponement of the effective date of the order with
respect to existing contracts and station licenses, and in regard to two of the
regulations the extension or suspension was "in order to permit the orderly dis-
position of properties." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
supra, 62 S. Ct. at 1070, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) at 1198. Is this consistent with a
mere announcement of policy? Thirdly, the wording of the FCC's first draft of
the proposed regulations is significant. In its notice of November 28, 1940, which
ordered argument on the first draft, most of the regulations began, "No licensee
of a standard broadcast station shall enter into any contractual relation, express
or implied, wtih a network organization which. . . " The final draft changed the
language to, "No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having
any contract . . . with a network organization which. . . ." Brief for Appellant,
pp. 44, 45, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, supra.
"' See cases cited supra notes 30-34.
" Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 57 S. Ct. 470, 81 L. ed. 643 (1937);
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382, 52 S. Ct. 440,
76 L. ed. 808 (1932); Western Pac. Cal. R. R. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S.
47, 52 S. Ct. 56, 76 L. ed. 160 (1931).
273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413, 71 L. ed. 651 (1927).
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bodies this decision and the means of enforcing it. The result is a
clash of interest between the network and the Commission which, the
principal case holds, may be resolved judicially through the procedure
of §402(a) of the Communications Act.
Nor is review barred by the "final order rule" precluding appeals
from interlocutory orders. The FCC's investigations, hearings and
deliberations have borne fruit in a legislative order which prescribes a
standard for future conduct. This integral part of the administrative
process has been concluded. What remains to be done is of a different
nature, i.e., the application of the standard to the individual cases as
they arise. Nothing in the law or the logic of this situation forces CBS
to await the second stage of the process before requesting judicial re-
view. Indeed, it seems highly probable that any remedies available at
that stage would be most inadequate.5 4.
The Supreme Court has no desire to extend the holding of the
principal case to review all announcements of policy,5 5 but seeks rather
to limit it to cases where by the exercise of rule-making power an
administrative agency determines legal rights, and where appeal from
later administrative adjudication of those rights would not be efficacious
in the prevention of serious injury. In the words of Chief Justice
Stone: "The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an
overrefined technique, but in the need.., to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other...
adjudications that may follow, the results of which the regulations
purport to control." 56
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.
*Appellantes affadavits state that it knows of no affiliated station which is
prepared to contest the order; the stations have seemingly elected to comply with
the FCC's regulations even if it means rescinding their contracts with CBS. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 27-30, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,
- U. S. -, 62 S. Ct. 1194, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1060 (1942). Even if one or
more stations did contest, the issues and effect of such proceedings would not be
the same as those in review under §402(a) of the Communications Act, 48 STAT.
1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §402(a) (Supp. 1941), and the decision would prob-
ably come too late to save Columbia from serious injury. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. United States, supra, 62 S. Ct. at 1203, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) at
1075.
G' For the various forms which such announcements may take, see Final Re-
port of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941)
26, 27.
" Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, -U. S.-, 62 S. Ct.
1194, 1204, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1060, 1076 (1942).
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Constitutional Law-Right to Waive Jury in Federal
Court without Advice of Counsel
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, recently held, one
judge dissenting, that a federal district court had no jurisdiction to
try a defendant charged with a felony where it appeared that the de-
fendant had been tried by the court without a jury after having
requested, without the advice and consent of an attorney, that he be
allowed to waive his constitutional right1 to a jury trial. A writ of
habeas corpus was issued directing the release of the defendant who
had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment after a trial by the
court.2
The decision was made to turn on the fact that the 'defendant had
not been assisted by counsel in making his decision to waive jury trial.
A reading of the opinion reveals, however, that the court had grave
doubts as to the constitutionality of any waiver of jury trial, either
with or without the assistance of counsel.
The history of the right to waive jury trial in the federal courts
may be briefly traced as follows: The constitutional provision for the
trial of all crimes by a jury was first interpreted as being mandatory,
and courts were held to have no jurisdiction to try, without a jury,
defendants accused of crime.3 Exceptions were that a jury could be
waived by a plea of guilty4 or by a failure to plead further after a
demurrer to the indictment had been overruled.5 Later, the rule was
relaxed to permit waiver of jury trial in prosecutions for "petty of-
fenses," which were said not to be "crimes" within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.e* The Supreme Court of the United States
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2; U. S. CONsT. AMEND. VI.
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams et al., 126 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
2d, 1942).8 United States v. Taylor, 11 F. 470 (C. C. Kan. 1882).
' West v. Gammon et al., 98 F. 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899).
r Summers v. United States, 204 F. 976 (C. C. A. 9th,'1913).
", Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 24 S. Ct. 826, 49 L. ed. 99 (1904);
Frank et al. v. United States, 192 F. 864 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); Low et al. v.
United States, 169 F. 86 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); United States v. Praeger, 149 F.
474 (W. D. Tex. 1907); accord, Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134 (C. C. A.
4th, 1923). The argument made by the courts in these cases was that the word
"crimes," as used in the Constitution, referred only- to criminal offenses of a
somewhat serious nature. They maintained that not all acts contrary to law were
triable by a jury at common law, and said that the makers of the Constitution, in
the course of debate, had changed the wording from "criminal offenses" to "crimes"
so as to exclude these petty offenses 'Which required no jury at common law. The
courts indicated that they would look to the nature of the punishment provided in
order to determine whether the offense was sufficiently serious to require a jury
trial. They stated specifically that it would not necessarily depend on whether
or not the offense was a felony or a misdemeanor. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting
in Schick v. United States, supra, said that neither the Constitution nor the Con-
gress had set up a criterion for deciding whether or not a jury was required for
a particular offense, and that the court had no authority to draw the line for itself.
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then rendered a decision in Patton et al. v. United States7 which has
long been interpreted by courts8 and legal periodicals 9 as standing for
the proposition that an accused on trial in a federal court for any crime
may waive his right to a jury trial if he does so intelligently, and if the
prosecution consents to such waiver.10 This case held that a defendant
on trial for a felony could consent to be tried by eleven jurors, where
it appeared that the twelfth juror had fallen ill after the beginning of
the trial, and was unable to serve further. The court added, by way of
dictum, that a decision that the presence of one juror could constitu-
tionally be waived logically required the conclusion that the whole jury
could be waived, since a constitutional jury was a common-law jury of
twelve, and no less."
The court in the principal case is obviously of the opinion that this
conclusion does not follow. It evidently believes that the Supreme
Court today would refuse to permit the total waiver of a jury. It
casts discredit on the dictum of Patton et al. v. United States in the
following language: "Since [the Patton case] the surrender of that
right [the right to jury trial] has not been before the Supreme Court,
but we are to assume that that decision is still law, at least as to the
point actually decided, which was that the accused might lawfully con-
sent to a jury of less than twelve-eleven as it chanced.... Hughes,
C. J., took no part in the decision, and Holmes, Brandeis and Stone,
JJ., concurred only in the result; perhaps because they did not think
that consenting to go on before a jury of eleven, after one had fallen
ill, involved the same constitutional question as consenting to a trial 'by
the court without a jury.' Whether or not it does, practically there is
much difference between being tried by a jury of eleven, or six, or
for that matter even of three, and being tried by the judge."'1 2  The
court then argues that a trial by even a very small jury preserves the
fundamental characteristics which have endeared the jury to the Amer-
ican judicial system, whereas a trial by a judge does not.
It is submitted that the court, believing that the judge would have
no jurisdiction to try the defendant without a jury under any coxditions,
seized upon the fact that the accused did not have the advice and con-
sent of counsel in regard to the waiver, in order to release him without
*281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. ed. 854, 70 A. L. R. 263, 279 (1930).
' Simons et al. v. United States, 119 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ; Brown
v. Zerbst, 99 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Spann v. Zerbst, 99 F. (2d) 336
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Irvin v. Zerbst, 97 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
'Naff, Jury Trial, Waiver Thereof, and the Alternate Juror (1933) 22 Ky.
L. J. 125; Notes (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 372; (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 447.
" Rees et al. v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
"Patton et al. v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 290, 50 S. Ct. 253, 255, 74
L. ed. 854, 859, 70 A. L. R. 263, 267 (1930), cited supra note 7.
12 United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams et al., 126 F. (2d) 774, 775 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1942), cited supra note 2.
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directly disaffirming the popular interpretation of the doctrine of Patton
et al. v. United States. The court admits that the defendant had waived
the jury with a full understanding of his constitutional rights, and that
he was probably capable of appraising his chances as between judge and
jury. The defendant, while not a member of any bar, had studied law,
and, after having been advised to retain a lawyer, stated that he wished
to act as his own counsel. He had been convicted before by a jury in
a trial involving transactions similar to those for which he was being
prosecuted, and concluded that he would have a better chance in a trial
before a judge. The present court argued that trial by jury is such a
fundamental right that the power to waive it without the assistance of
counsel should not depend upon the outcome of a preliminary inquiry
as to the competency of the particular accused. Rather, concludes the
court, he must be presumed to be incompetent to waive his right to a
jury trial, and must retain an attorney to advise him on such waiver,
even though the advice of the attorney extends to no more than that
particular choice.
There are both practical and legalistic objections to this conclusion.
As a practical matter, many persons, not lawyers, would be capable of
making a well-advised and intelligent choice between judge and jury.
The ability to make such a decision does not necessarily depend upon
whether or not one is an attorney. To force one who wishes to be
tried by a judge and to conduct his own defense to call in a lawyer for
the sole purpose of waiving a jury would be to put the defendant to
unnecessary expense. If he is capable of defending himself, he is
capable of waiving jury trial, and there would be no logic in forcing
him to pay for a service which would be more form than substance.
The court has placed a limitation upon the right of an accused to
act as his own attorney. The reason advanced is that the right to
jury trial is a fundamental one which should be zealously protected by
the courts. The court, however, overlooks the fact that other funda-
mental rights may be waived without the advice of an attorney. The
right to counsel has itself been held to be a fundamental right.'3 This
right may be waived.1 4 It would, of course, be absurd to hold that the
right to counsel can be waived only upon the advice of counsel. Yet
the reasoning of the court would lead to this result.
A California court, dealing with the problem before the court in the
principal case, reached a different result.15 It reasoned that the right
to waive counsel carried with it the implication that the defendant
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158, 84 A. L. R.
527, 544 (1932).1 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. ed 1461 (1938).
'" People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 965, 108 P. (2d) 105 (1940).
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might do for himself that which he and his counsel together might do.
This, in the opinion of the writer, is a better line of reasoning than that
pursued in the principal case. When a defendant without counsel
comes before the court asking that he be tried without a jury, the court
should decide whether the defendant understands the full nature and
:onsequences of his request. If the court believes him competent to
make such waiver, then he should be allowed to do so. A preliminary
inquiry of this nature would not be unduly burdensome on the court.
These weaknesses in the court's argument as to the necessity of
having advice of counsel concerning the waiver of jury trial strengthen
the belief of the writer that the defendant's lack of counsel was not the
real reason for the -decision. The determining factor seems to have
been the court's belief that the constitutional provision for the trial of all
crimes by a jury is mandatory, and that no federal judge has juris-
diction to try, without a jury, a defendant accused of felony.
Certiorari has been granted,16 and the principal case will soon come
before the Supreme Court for final determination. It is to be hoped
that the court will take this opportunity to clarify, once and for all,
the status of the right of an accused to completely waive trial by jury.
It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will subscribe to the denial
of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the case of Patton et al. v. United
States stands for the proposition that a jury trial may be waived. The
term "jury" as used in the constitutional provision means a common-
law jury of twelve. 17 If, as the Patton case undoubtedly held, the pres-
ence of one juror may be waived, it follows that the provision is not
mandatory, since the nature of the Constitution is such that it will not
allow even a partial waiver of any of its mandatory provisions.
The problem of the principal case would not arise in the North
Carolina courts. The State Constitution decrees that the trial of all
crimes, except petty misdeameanors, must be by a jury.18  This pro-
vision has been held to be mandatory, and does not merely guarantee
a right which may be waived. 19 It has been held that this jury must
consist of twelve persons. 20 However, an act2' providing that the court
18Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 62 S. Ct. 1048, 86 L. ed. 937 (1942).
'7 Patton et al. v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. ed. 854,
70 A. L. R. 263, 279 (1930), cited supra notes 7 and 11.8 N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §13.
"9 State v. Muse, 219 N. C. 226, 13 S. E. (2d) 219 (1941) ; State v. Hill, 209
N. C. 53, 182 S. E. 716 (1935); State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E. 394
(1922) ; State v. Camby, 209 N. C. 50, 182 S. E. 715 (1935) (holding unconsti-
tutional c. 23, N. C. PuBLic LAWS 1933, as amended by c. 469, N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §4636(a), providing for trial by the court as upon a plea of "Not
Guilty," when a defendant enters a "conditional plea" under the act).
'0 State v. Rogers, 162 N. C. 656, 78 S. E. 293 (1913) ; State v. Scruggs, 115
N. C. 805, 20 S. E. 720 (1894).
2N. C. Pumisc LAWS 1931, c. 103, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §233(a).
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may order the selection of an alternate juror to sit with the other
twelve and serve as a juror in case one of the original twelve should
die or be discharged has been held not to infringe upon the constitu-
tional provisions 22
JOEL DENTON.
Federal Crimes-Interpretation of Statute for Protection of National
Banks-Incorporation of State Definition of Felony into
Federal Criminal Statute
Petitioner was indicted and convicted under the National Banking
Law for entering a national bank in Nebraska with the intent to cash
a no fund check for $42.50, which he in fact succeeded in cashing. The
statute under which the indictment was drawn reads:
".. . or whosoever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank, or build-
ing used in whole or in part as a bank, with intent to commit in such
bank or building or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny, shall
be... [fined or imprisoned]."'
The cashing of a bad check is not of itself an offense against the United
States, but it is a felony under the laws of Nebraska. 2 Petitioner
brought habeas corpus proceedings against the warden of the Federal
Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, on the ground that he had com-
mitted no offense against the United States. The United States Dis-
trict Court of Kansas granted habeas corpus. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the decision, holding that by using the
words "any felony" Congress indicated an intent to include in the
statute all felonies, under either federal or state law, having relation
to the preservation of the efficiency of a national bank.3
The general rule is that penal statutes are to be construed strictly,
but this rule is relaxed to the extent that they are not to be construed
so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.4  Congress
had the power to adopt state felonies by this statute if it wished to do
so,5 but there seems to be no precedent for such adoption by the court
under the guise of interpreting Congressional intent.
2 State v. Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E. 422 (1934).
150 STAT. 749 (1937), 12 U.. S. C. A. §588b (a) (Supp. 1942). This statute
was passed in 1937 to amend the bank robbery statute so as to include burglary
and larceny, or entry with intent to commit any felony or larceny.
' ComP. STAT. NEBR. (1929) Ch. 28, §1212; Ch. 29, §102.
'-Hudspeth v. Melville, 127 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) (one judge
dissenting). Same holding on the basis of this case in Hudspeth v. Tornello, 128
F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) (same judge dissenting); United States v.
Jerome, 130 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1942) (one judge dissenting), cert.
granted, Jerome v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3106 (U. S. 1942).
' United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 5 L. ed. 37 (1820);
MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (6th ed. 1920) 484.
' Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 47 S. Ct. 629, 71 L. ed. 1036 (1927)
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The United States courts do not recognize common-law offenses,
the criminal jurisdiction of the courts being derived expressly from acts
of Congress ;6 nor can the federal courts take cognizance of state stat-
utes in criminal proceedings to make an act an offense which is not
made so by Congress.7  Neither can statutes creating and defining
crimes be extended by intendment, and no act, however wrongful, can
be punished unless dearly within the terms of the statute.8 These
familiar doctrines seem to lead to the conclusion that the courts are
bound to consider only offenses defined by Acts of Congress, and can-
not look to state statutes for definitions unless they are so authorized
by an unmistakable Congressional intent.
In other intances where Congress has intended to incorporate state
laws into the federal law there has been an express announcement of
that intent. An example of this is the specific adoption of the state
penal offenses as offenses against the federal government when they
are committed on government-owned property.0 This statute was up-
held by the Supreme Court ;10 however, this would not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that such adoption was intended in the present statute,
for it contains no expression of that intent unless the word "any" is
construed as indicating such a purpose.
11*
It would seem that "felony" as used in a federal statute must log-
ically be interpreted to mean a felony under the Federal Criminal Code
as Congress has -defined it.1 2  It is generally held that a statutory
definition of a word must prevail regardless of what other meaning
may be attributable thereto.1 The fact that the statute in question is
(holding that Congress may protect state banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System by making acts committed within them criminal); Franklin v.
United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 S. Ct. 434, 54 L. ed. 615 (1910) (holding that
Congress may incorporate state offenses as offenses against the federal govern-
ment where it has jurisdiction).
6 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (1812) ; CLARK
& MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (2d ed. 1927) §12(b), p. 21.7United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1880).
'Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 15 S. Ct. 889, 39 L. ed. 982 (1895).935 STAT. 1145 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §468 (1927).
20 Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 S. Ct. 434, 54 L. ed. 615 (1910).
1* When the statute was first drawn by the Attorney General it read "any
larceny or other depredation," but the House Judiciary Committee amended it to
read "any felony or larceny," H. R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937),
and the basis for the holding in the instant case was this substitution. It could
easily be argued that "felony" was substituted for "other depredation" merely
to make the statute clearer, and that "any" was left in because it was there when
the statute was first written to show that the statute included all larcenies.
1235 STAT. 1152 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §541 (1927).1 8Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780
(1934); see Emery Byrd Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. (2d) 166,
170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). These cases involve civil suits, but their use of a word
in a statute would be analogous to the use of a word in a criminal statute when
that word is defined by statute.
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under the banking code rather than the criminal code would not seem
to make any difference, for it is a penal offense, even though jurisdic-
tion over it is had under the power of the government to regulate
national banks and currency. It would hardly seem, in the light of this
reasoning, that "felony" as used in the statute is ambiguous, but even
if it were considered to be so, ambiguities are not to be solved so as to
embrace offenses not clearly within the law,14 and judicial enlargement
of a criminal statute by interpretation is at war with a fundamental
concept of common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate
definiteness. 15
Along with that portion of the statute considered in this case, Con-
gress made the additional provision that when there was an actual tak-
ing or carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin any money or
property belonging to or in the custody of the bank, it should be pun-
ished as therein specified, the punishment being such as to make the
crime a felony when the amount was over $50, and a misdemeanor
when it was $50 or less.16 This could lead to the conclusion that
Congress meant to make the same distinction when there is an entering
with "intent to commit any felony or larceny." There would seem to
be no logical basis for arguing that the entering with intent to obtain
$42.50 by cashing a -bad check should be a more serious offense than
actually stealing $42.50; and had the indictment been for the latter,
under the statute itself, petitioner could only have received a sentence
of one year and a fine of $1,000 or both. However, it was possible,
under the interpretation incorporating the state law to give him a sen-
tence of twenty years, and a fine of $5,000. Under this construction
the statute provides a greater penalty for entering with intent to com-
mit the crime than it -does if the crime is actually committed. Thus it
would be better for purposes of punishment to indict him for an entry
with intent, for which he could be given up to twenty years and a fine
of $5,000, than for an actual commission of the larceny, for which he
could only get ten years and a fine of $5,000. It would seem that there
would be no need for the distinction between grand and petit larceny
unless it was also intended to limit the entering With intent to commit
any felony correspondingly. This observation may be strengthened by
"I Krichman v. United States, 256 U. S. 363, 41 S. Ct. 514, 65 L. ed. 992
(1921) (holding that a porter was not to be considered an officer of the United
States when the government was operating the railroads).
" Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306, 62 S. Ct. 237, 86 L. ed. 238 (1941)
(holding that the interpretation of a statute making it a crime to impersonate a
federal officer did not extend to an officer under the T. V. A.).
1050 STAT. 749 (1937), 12 U. S. C. A. §588b(a) (Supp. 1942). When the
robbery statute was amended in 1937 entering with intent to commit any felony
or larceny was made the same grade offense as robbery itself as far as the pen-
alties are concerned, but a distinction was made when there was a completed
larceny, between grand and petit.
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the fact that when the bill was first on the floor of Congress it did not
differentiate between a felony and a misdemeanor,17 but later it was
suggested in debate that such a distinction was necessary so that all
grades of completed larceny would not be penalized in the same man-
ner,'8 and an amendment was added providing for this division.'0 In
a case decided in the same circuit as the instant case the statute was
interpreted as creating four separate and distinct offenses, in that the
force and violence required in the first part of the statute to create
robbery was not essential to the offenses of entering with intent to
commit any felony or larceny or the actual completion of the larceny.
20
This could be interpreted as a holding that Congress did not intend
for the division of larceny in the completed offense to limit in any way
the clause relating to entering with intent to commit any felony or
larceny.
An analogous situation to the instant case might arise under a pro-
vision of the espionage act authorizing the issuance of a search warrant
where the property to be seized was used as a means of committing "a
felony."'2 ' In interpreting the act the court held that "felony" covers
any felony arising under any federal statutes. 22" The present question
might well arise, however, where the goods seized were used in the
commission of an offense against the state, but not against the federal
government.
Passing on from the logic of the construction of the statute it might
be well to look at some of the practical effects of such a construction.
This interpretation of the statute can make an act committed in one
state an offense against the federal government, whereas if it were com-
mitted in another state it would be no offense against the federal gov-
ernment. For instance, if petitioner had presented his check in North
Carolina he could not have been indicted under the statute, for the
North Carolina law makes cashing a bad check only a misdemeanor ;23
but had he written it in West Virginia he would be guilty of a felony
under the West Virginia Code24" and thus would be guilty of an offense
against the United States.
1 7 H. R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
2881 CONG. REc. 4656 (1937). 1981 CoNG. REc. 5376 (1937).
"Alford v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).2140 STAT. 228 (1917), 18 U. S. C. A. §612(2) (1927).
22* Conyer v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). There is a
distinction here in that "a felony" is used rather than "any felony." One could
be interpreted to go as far as the other, however.
23 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4283.
"* WEST VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §5980. If the check were for less
than $20.00 under this statute it would be a misdemeanor. In the Fourth Circuit
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, of the five states therein, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Maryland make the offense of writing a bad check a misdemeanor.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4283; CODE OF LAWS OF S. C. (Michie, 1932)
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It is stated in a federal case in Indiana involving the same statute
that Congress did not intend to include the offense of obtaining money
under false pretenses in the statute, for it did not expressly provide
for that offense.2 5  This holding is an example of the same statute
being given a strict interpretation. If the indictment had been as in
the present case the defendant could have been convicted, for the writing
of a bad check is a felony under the Indiana law.2 6 A like result was
reached in a Pennsylvania case where the defendant was released be-
cause his act of giving a forged check did not constitute either larceny
or a federal felony ;2T but had he merely been indicted for intending to
give a forged check he would have been within the present interpreta-
tion of the statute, for forgery is a felony under the Pennsylvania
Code.28  These decisions would tend to show that other judges and
prosecuting officers are not completely in accord with the interpretation
given in the present case, and the possibility of having non-uniform
offenses against the federal government might make it wise either to
rewrite the law, indicating freely the intention of Congress, or to in-
terpret the statute so that it covers only felonies under the federal law.
Certiorari has recently been granted 29 in a case concerning the same
issue involved in the instant decision, and an authoritative ruling may
soon be forthcoming. C. D. HOGUE, JR.
Marine Insurance-Return of Excess Premiums-Innocent
Overvaluaion-Risk Bearing in Transoceanic Shipments
A pearl necklace, left in Germany upon the death of the owner, was
adjudged by a German "official protocol" to be worth $60,000, and
was sought to be obtained from Germany by the executors of the estate
§1167; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939), Art. 27, §§152 and 150. Virginia and
West Virginia both have distinctions as to when the offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor; Virginia turning the offense into larceny and making distinction
between grand and petit larceny at $5.00t; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936)
§4149(44), grand larceny being a felony, id. §4758. It is thus possible to commit
the same crime within the same circuit and be guilty of an offense against the
United States if it is committed in one part, and not guilty if committed in an-
other part. There would not seem to be any apparent reason why the cashing of
a check in a national bank would impair its efficiency more in one state so as to
make it an offense against the United States than in another where it would be no
offense against the United States.
" United States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596 (N. D. Ind. 1940). Here the
indictment was for larceny by trick, and the court held that the defendant could
not be convicted because there was consent to the taking of the title and the
possession of the money.
-" IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§10-2105, and 9-101.
2T United States v. Patton, 120 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941) (indictment
was for larceny, but the court held that the bank relinquished title and possession
when it cashed the forged check and thus it could not be larceny).
28 18 PENNA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) §3611.
"Jerome v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3106 (U. S. 1942).
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and the heir. A war-risk insurance policy was taken out against loss
in transit of the pearls, "valued at . . . [$60,000]." Premiums of over
$2,000 were paid. Upon its arrival the necklace was found to be
worth only a little more than $60.00, the German "official protocol"
allegedly being incorrect in stating its value. Executors therefore sue
to recover the excessive premiums paid the insurance company, basing
their suit on a count for "money had and received," and also requesting
reformation of the insurance policy. Held: Recovery denied. Equity
will reform a contract when it does not state what the parties intended,
but will not create a new and entirely different contract. Here there
is no indication of intent to obtain a lesser amount of insurance than
$60,000 worth. Also, the insurance company has rendered considera-
tion worth all the premium paid, for if the necklace had been lost at
sea the true value of it would never have been known, and the insurer
would have had to pay the $60,000 loss.'
Practically all of the decisions (certainly the important ones) con-
cerning overvaluation of the protected property by the insured have
dealt with a situation in which a loss of the property has occurred, and
the insurer is seeking to resist payment because of an alleged over-
valuation. The present case differs in that the risk has terminated
without a loss of the protected property so that insured is seeking to
recover excess premiums paid because of mistaken overvaluation rather
than to obtain indemnification. However, despite the factual peculiar-
ity of the present case, a knowledge of the law as set down in the
ordinary overvaluation decision is important background for the under-
standing of this case.
The effect of overstating the value of insured property has under-
gone a rather obvious change in the past century. 'The earlier cases
abided by the rule that even an absolutely innocent and unintentional
overstatement by the insured, if it were a material and substantial over-
statement, would avoid2 * the policy.3 This rule put the duty squarely
Orient Insurance Co. v. Dunlap, 193 Ga. 241, 17 S. E. (2d) 703 (1941).
'* See VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1930) 360 n. 72.
When used with reference to insurance policies, the words "void," "vitiate,"
and similar language are generally used in decisions and texts not to mean void
ab initio, but rather "voidable at the option of the injured party." Since most
insurance cases arise from an attempt by the insurer to resist performance, so
that the insurer will always exercise any option he may have to avoid the policy,
the distinction between "void" and "voidable" is usually immaterial. In the
present case, though, the distinction might be of prime importance. If this policy
were void ab initio the insured here would have a much easier case for the return
of his premiums than if the policy were merely voidable at the option of the
insurer, since obviously the insurer does not elect to avoid. See infra, pp. 94 f., to
the effect that insured might recover in the present case, notwithstanding the
fact that the insurer has not exercised his option to avoid.
' Carpenter v. Providence Insurance Co., 16 Peters (U. S.) 495, 10 L. ed.
1044 (1842); Smith v. Royal Insurance Co., 37 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1941);
Carrolton Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 115 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2nd,
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upon the insured in all cases to find out the value of the goods he
wished to have insured, and to state same to the insurer accurately,
upon pain of being unable to recover for injury to or loss of the prop-
erty even to the extent of the smaller true value of it.
The modem cases have looked the other way-so that today the
majority rule may be said to be that an innocent mistake, even to a
substantial amount, will not cause a policy to be void.4  It would seem
that under the modern rule neither insured nor insurer would be greatly
interested in whether or not the protected property were overvalued.
However, the insurer may be anxious to avoid overstatement so as to
cut down the "moral hazard." And the insured is of course anxious
to avoid paying too high a premium.
1902); Carpenter v. American Insurance Co., 1 Story 57, Fed. Cas. No. 2428(C. C. D. R. I. 1839) ; National Insurance Co. v. Duncan, 44 Colo. 472, 98 Pac.
634, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 340 (1908) ; Continental Insurance Co. v. Farlan, 219 Ky.
462, 293 S. W. 952 (1927); Niagara Insurance Co. v. Layne, 162 Ky. 665, 172
S. W. 1090 (1915); Protection Insurance Co. v. Hall, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411(1854); Dennison v. Thomaston Insurance Co., 20 Me. 125 (1841); Wood v.
Fireman's Insurance Co., 126 Mass. 316 (1879); Wilbur v. Bowditch Insurance
Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 446 (1852); Davenport v. New England Insurance Co.,
6 Cush. (Mass.) 340 (1849); Houghton v. Insurance Co., 8 Metc. (Mass.) 114(1844); Bryant v. Ocean Insurance Co., 22 Pick (Mass.) 200 (1838); Stetson
v. Massachusetts Insurance Co., 4 Mass. 330 (1808); Shelden v. Michigan In-
surance Co., 124 Mich. 303, 82 N. W. 1068 (1900) ; Briggs v. Fireman's Insurance
Co., 65 Mich. 55, 31 N. W. 616 (1887); Smith v. Automobile Insurance Co., 188
Mo. App. 297, 175 S. W. 113 (1915); Leach v. Insurance Co., 58 N. H. 245(1883); 'Hersey v. Merrimack Insurance Co., 7 Fost. (N. H.) 149 (1855);
Armour v. Transatlantic Insurance Co., 90 N. Y. 450 (1882) ; Evans v. Columbia
Insurance Co., 40 Misc. 316, 81 N. Y. Supp. 933 (1903); Bobbit v. Liverpool
Insurance Co., 66 N. C. 70 (1871); Lexington Insurance Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio
324 (1847); Nassauer v. Susquehanna Insurance Co., 109 Pa. St. 507 (1885);
Catron v. Tennessee Insurance Co., 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 176 (1845); Home In-
surance Co. v. Eakin, 2 Tex. Civ. Cas. §665 (1885); Boutelle v. Westchester
Fire Insurance Co., 51 Vt. 431 (1878) ; Ionides v. Pender, L. R. 9 Q. B. 531(Eng. 1882); Newton v. Gore Insurance Co., 33 U. C. (C. P.) 92 (Eng. 1875);
Riach v. Niagara Insurance Co., 21 U. P. (C. P.) 464 (Eng. 1861); Dickson v.
Equitable Fire Insurance Co., 18 U. C. (Q. B.) 246 (Eng. 1859) ; Shaw v. St.
Lawrence Insurance Co., 11 U. C. (Q. B.) 73 (Eng. 1851); Continental Insur-
ance Co. v. Ware, 9 Ins. L. J. 519 (1876).
'First National Bank v. Hartford Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563
(1877) ; Franklin Insurance Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, 23 L. ed. 740 (1876) ;
Hartford Live Stock Insurance Co. v. McMillen, 9 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925); Columbian Insurance Co. v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed. 355 (C. C. A.
8th, 1921) ; Miller v. Alliance Insurance Co., 7 Fed. 649 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1881) ;
Atlas Insurance Co. v. Robison, 94 Ark. 390, 127 S. W. 456 (1910); Cottam v.
National Church Insurance Co., 209 Ill. App. 404 (1918) ; Home Insurance Co. v.
Overturf, 35 Ind. App. 361, 74 N. E. 47 (1905) ; Dwelling House Insurance Co.
v. Freeman, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 894, 15 S. W. 856 (1891); Garnier v. Aetna In-
surance Co., 181 La. 426, 159 So. 705 (1935) ; German Fire Insurance Co. v.
Cohen, 114 Md. 130, 78 A. 911 (1910); Bernadich v. Lincoln Mutual Insurance
Co., 287 Mich. 137, 283 N. W. 5 (1938) ; Mississippi Fire Insurance Co. v. Dixon,
133 Miss. 570, 98 So. 101 (1923); Delaware Insurance Co. v. Hill, 127 S. W.
283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Morotock Insurance Co. v. Fostoria Glass Co., 94 Va.
361, 26 S. E. 850 (1897); see especially Lynchburg Insurance Co. v. West, 76
Va. 575 (1882). See comment (1941) 19 LEHiGH LAW JoURN. 139.
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A few of even the very early cases did follow the "modern" rule,
and these gradually became more and more numerous. It appears that
the very first reported American case to offer a faint suggestion of
what ultimately became the modern rule was Wolcott v. Eagle Insur-
ance Company,5 . in 1827. Plaintiff operated a brig and was away
from the home port for many months at a time, making many stops in
distant lands. The value of the cargo was great at times and small at
times. " Plaintiff had stated that the average value was around $2,500,
and defendant insurer issued him a policy in that amount. At the time
of the loss sued on, the insured part of the cargo was worth consider-
ably less than $2,500. The case turned on other questions than the
one of valuation, but the counsel for plaintiff interposed the argument
that "Where the assured in a valued policy has anything at risk under
the policy, there being no fraud, the valuation is conclusive." The
Wolcott case was then cited by counsel in Borden v. Hingham Fire
Insurance Company," which stated, on the subject of overvaluation,
"The plaintiffs made and the defendants accepted the estimate; and
the contract was made on that basis. No fraud, concealment, or gam-
ing is suggested. We are all of the opinion that the plaintiffs are en-
titled to recover." The Hingham Insurance Company case was then
cited in Fuller v. Boston Fire Insurance Company,7 and in Wood on
Fire Insurance.8 Thus the modern rule was born.
Some cases pretended to abide by the settled rule that any material
overvaluation, whether fraudulent or innocent, would avoid the policy,
yet circumvented the rule in cases where it would work an injustice by
simply calling any overvaluation, even one of twofold the actual value,0
or of a third again actual value,10 an immaterial and unsubstantial
overvaluation.
A clear and typical clash of the two doctrines, the old and the new,
can be seen in the three Eakin cases, quite noted in their -day. The inter-
mediate court of appeals, citing the Massachusetts cases, supra, and
Wood on Fire Insurance, held that only an overvaluation so gross that
fraud must of necessity be presumed would vitiate the policy. 1 The
'*4 Pick (Mass.) 445, 21 Mass. 429 (1827). 2 MAY, INSURANCE (3d ed.,
1890), §373A, p. 827, n. 3, states that the modern rule was born in Texas. The
most diligent search by the author, however, would clearly give Massachusetts this
honor.
' 18 Pick (Mass.) 523, 35 Mass. 523 (1836). In the Borden case the question
was whether the value of the insured's interest in the protected property was
worth the full value of the face of the policy. There was no question as to the
value of the property itself. The court held that in the absence of fraud, insured
could recover the full face of the policy.
'4 Metc. (Mass.) 206, 45 Mass. 206 (1842).
'WooD, FIRE INSURANCE (1878) 431, §220, n. 6.
'Conn v. Imperial Fire Insurance Co., 1 R. & C. (Nova Scotia) 240.
"'Franklin Insurance Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, 23 L. ed. 740 (1876).
11 R. E. Eakin v. Home Insurance Co., 1 Tex. Civ. Cas. 155 (1883).
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highest appelate court reversed this holding, stating that any material
overvaluation, whether by mistake or fraud, would bar recovery on the
policy.12
The old rule has still been followed in some comparatively recent
decisions.' 3
As to the case where there is a fraudulent overvaluation, the law
appears the same in nearly all cases, old and modem: If the mis-
valuation was material or substantial the policy is void; otherwise
not.14*
The change that has occurred in the law is clearly reflected by the
text writers, the early ones stating the "old" (now minority) rule, the
transition ones being rather confused, and the .recent writers stating
the modern majority rule.
The third edition of May on Insurance; published in 1891, follows
the earlier editions in stating that where the policy provides that over-
valuation will avoid it, then any substantial overvaluation, innocent or
fraudulent, will avoid the policy; and where the policy does not state
that overvaluation will avoid it, the same is true. However, May
recognizes that in the latter case there is a tendency to hold that only
gross innocent overvaluation will avoid the policy.15*
As late as 1921, Corpus Juris stated the law in accordance with
May above. A few pages later, however, it states that the "old" rule
applies only to warranties, and not to representations. A general con-
fusion of the cases on the matter is said to exist.:6
The fourth edition of Richards, in 1932, emphasized still another
way of dividing and distinguishing between the cases using the "old"
and the "new" rules: viz., that the "old" rule that an innocent over-
valuation would avoid the policy is still today the majority rule in
inarine insurance cases, while the "new" rule is the majority in other
types of property insurance cases. The reason, as indicated by Rich-
ards, is that a marine insurer is entitled to practically a guaranty of
"Home Insurance Co. v. R. E. Eakin, 2 Tex. Civ. App. Reps. 587 (1885).
's Smith v. Royal Insurance Co., 37 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1941).14*2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891), §373; 4 RIcHARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed.
1932), 363, §233; 26 CORPUS JuRas, FIR INSURANCE (1921), §189(b); VANCE,
INsURANcE (2d. ed. 1930), §190; 29 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, INSURANCE
(1940), §1132. But see Lycoming Insurance Co. v. Ruben, 79 Ill. 402 (1876),
and 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE (1942), §2601, to the effect that any fraudulent
overvaluation may avoid the policy, whether material or not.
11*2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891), §§373-4. The case of Citizens Fire and
Marine Insurance Company v. Short, 62 Ind. 316 (1878), in discussing an identical
section from an earlier edition of May, criticized May's adherence to the "old"
rule: "It states the law on the subject of overvaluation more strongly in favor of
the insurer than we think the cases will warrant. In our opinion, the over-
valuation must be knowingly false and fraudulent, or it will not have the effect
of vitiating or avoiding the policy."1626 CoRPUs JURIS, FIRE INSURANCE (1921) §§188-191, 205-6.
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the truthfulness of the insured's description of the protected property,
because in many cases the property may be overseas so that the insurer
has no opportunity to inspect it. This circumstance is said not to be
true of other forms of property insurance. Richards' conclusions seem
to be backed up by good case authority.17
Vance, in 1930, seems to have committed the error of stating quite
bluntly in one place that the "old" Tule is the law (except as to mere
statements of opinion and belief), Is while several chapters later he
clearly states that the modem rule is in the majority.10 However,
Vance's point seems to be that all statements as to the value of prop-
erty must be treated as mere opinion, except valuations of items which
have a definite stipulated value (such as the value of a mortgage on the
insured property). Thus the inconsistency is largely explained away.
Patterson concurs with Vance's conclusion that statements of val-
uation are largely opinion, citing First National Bank of Kansas City
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company.20 Hence the insurer can avoid
the policy only if there is a fraudulent misvaluation, which would in-
volve the considerable difficulty of proving that the insured did not
actually "think what he said he thought." Such a statement of opinion
is therefore "worthless," says Patterson, insofar as aiding the insurer
in litigation upon the policy.21
Appleman on Insurance, 1941, presents a very discerning analysis
of the cases on this point.22 He begins by giving a general statement
of the "new" majority rule that a fraudulent and substantial overval-
uation will usually avoid the policy whereas an innocent one usually
will not. Appleman points out the confusion on the point of innocent
overvaluation, but states that the better modern courts realize that
statements of value are largely mere opinion and that nearly everyone
is inclined quite innocently to place an exaggerated value on his own
goods. These considerations, plus the fact that a court may always
fall back on the device of presuming fraud in case there is a very
grossly exaggerated value, have been the principal reasons for the
switch to the "new" rule. Appleman indicates, and with a substantial
backing of decisions, that innocent overvaluation is more apt to be
excused where the policy is of the "open" form than where it is
"valued." Nearly all policies today are "open" ones (another reason
for the switch to the new rule). Under such a policy the original state-
ment of value is not of importance in determining the amount that an
'
7 RcHARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) §§79-80.
1 8 VANCE, INSURANcE (2d ed. 1930) §107, at p. 368.
1 9 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §190, at p. 724.
2095 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 563 (1877).
21 PAERSON, INSURANCE (1935) §67, at p. 278.
224 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE (1941) §§2601-2.
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insurer must pay in the event of loss, for the insured is indemnified in
accordance with the value of the property at the time of the loss. The
original statement of value is therefore important only in determining
the amount of the premium, and because the moral hazard is thought
to be increased if property is insured for more than actual value. If
it is a valued policy, on the other hand, then the amount the insurer
must pay after a loss is calculated in accordance with the original
statement of value in the application for insurance. Courts are there-
fore much less willing to excuse an overvaluation in such a policy, and
much more willing to consider the overvaluation as fraudulent.2 * The
very fact that the policy is of the valued type is calculated to put the
insured on notice.that he must be especially careful and accurate in his
statement of value.
The sketch treatment of this subject in the American Jurisprudence
volume on Insurance seems well taken in so far as it goes.24 It is clearly
stated that the majority rule today is that an innocent overvaluation
will not avoid a policy of insurance. Also, it is well shown that geh-
erally it makes no difference, in cases concerning overvaluation of
property, whether the misstatement occurred in the proofs of loss, or
in the original application for the policy. The law is the same in both
cases.
25
Such, then, is the law as stated by the cases and the authorities
who have attempted to analyze them.
As to the present case, it should be noted at the outset that if the
insured is to be allowed any relief it cannot be by reformation of the
policy as sought by the plaintiff here. Some other basis for relief must
be found, such as that the mistake was of such nature that it will avoid
the policy; or that the authorities have generally allowed a return of
premiums when they "reopen" the valuation of a valued policy. For
the court in the principal case decided, and rightly so, that the insured
could not have had reformation here. "There was no agreement or
intention as to insurance of a necklace made of 'Japanese' or cultured
pearls; and if the contract should now be so reformed as to cover a
necklace of the latter character, it would be converted into something
which the parties never intended." While in a proper case equity may
8 See, infra, pp. 95 f., as to the right of the insurer to "reopen" the stipulated
valuation after a loss, if he feels there has been an overvaluation; and as to the
right of the insured, upon such "reopening," to recover excess premiums paid
because of an innocent overvaluation.
2 29 AMERICAN JURIsPRUDENcE, INSURANCE (1940) §§1132-4.
" Orenstein v. Star Insurance Co., 10 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926);
Columbian Insurance Co. v. Modem Laundry, 277 Fed. 355, 20 A. L. R. 1159
(C. C_. A. 8th, 1921); Erb v. German-American Insurance Co., 98 Iowa 606, 67
N. W. 583 (1896) ; Stone v. Hawkeye Insurance Co., 68 Iowa 737, 28 N. W. 47
(1886).
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reform a written contract which, because of a mistake or inadvertence
in drawing up the instrument-as a stenographical error, etc.-does
not express what the parties intended, it can do so only to the extent
of making it speak the actual agreement, and cannot make a new and
different contract for the parties.
The present case is an attempt by the insured to recover excess
premiums, rather than an attempt by the insurer to escape liability
because of misvaluation. However, whether or not these premiums can
be recovered depends upon whether or not the policy was valid, for it
is -the well-established rule in marine insurance that, with regard to
return of premiums for overinsurance, if the insurer could have at any
time and under any circumstances been called upon to pay the whole
sum on which he had received premiums, then the entire premium is
earned, and there can be no recovery of any part of it by the insured.
But if the insurer could never have been called upon to pay the whole,
then he must return an amount of the premium commensurate with
that percentage of the whole value of the insured property which he
could not have been forced to make good in case of a loss. 26 In short,
the insurer can usually keep the premiums only if he bore the risk. The
rule therefore is based upon failure of consideration.2 7
It would seem that the insurer did not bear a risk in the present
case because if he had been sued on the policy there are several defenses
which he might have interposed so as to escape any payment. First, this
was a marine insurance policy. As stated, 28 the so-called "old" rule is
controlling in such a case. An innocent overvaluation, if substantial,
will avoid the policy. Second, in many cases where the valuation is
very greatly inaccurate (as in the present case, where a $60.00 neck-
lace was stated to be worth $60,000) the courts have adopted the device,
in order to prevent obvious injustice, of presuming fraud, so that the
policy is void under the universally accepted rule that a fraudulent sub-
stantial misstatement will avoid the policy. 29 And third, the policy in
the present case was a valued one. As stated,8 0 proper valuation is of
such importance in such a policy that the courts have generally expected
an applicant for insurance to be positive of the value of the protected
property. A substantial overvaluation, even an innocent one, will
usually avoid a valued policy.
The insurer may claim, however, and upon good authority, that
2 VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §92, at p. 322; 2 ARNOULD, MARINE IN-
SURANCE (11th ed. 1924) §1259.2 7 Tyrie v. Fletcher, 2 Cowp. 666, 98 Reprint 1297 (Eng. 1777); VANCE, IN-
SURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §93, at p. 321.
"See, supra, pp. 91 f., the summary of Richards' discussion.
2 See, supra, pp. 92 f., the summary of Appleman's discussion.
30 Ibid.
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these defenses do not render the policy absolutely void, but merely
voidable at his option so that until the insurer has exercised his option
(which naturally he did not do here) the policy must be treated as
valid and he must be regarded as having carried the risk. 1
This contention of the insurer may be discounted in several possible
ways. First, the language in many cases and texts seems to indicate
that a material misvaluation of the protected property in a marine
policy will cause the policy to be ab initio void (so that the risk never
attaches), and not merely voidable at the will of the insurer3 2 *
And second, there is authority that the risk does attach, but that
nevertheless there may be a recovery of premiums commensurate with
the amount of overinsurance, by a "reopening" or reconsideration of
the value even in a valued policy. In Forbes v. Aspinwal,33 and Rick-
man v. Carstairs,S4 it was established that notwithstanding the fact that
" See, supra, n. 2.
2* For example, 4 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE (1941) §2601, states, "A gross
exaggeration of the value or substantial misstatement will relieve the insurer of
all liability thereunder." And 2 MAY, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1891) §373, says, "It
is not necessary that the overvaluation be intentional and fraudulent to-have the
effect of vitiating the policy." Further, "For no overvaluation but a gross and
clear one ... will in either case be held to vitiate the policy; and such a one will
avoid the policy, whether provided against or not." And RIcHARDs, INSURANCE
(4th ed. 1932) §79, states, "In marine insurance, a concealment of a material
circumstance . . . whether intentional or unintentional, innocent or fraudulent,
avoids the contract." Further, "The validity of the marine policy impliedly is
conditioned upon the completeness and accuracy of the description of the char-
acter of the risk as put forth by the applicant."
And Merchants Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 219 App. Div. 636,
220 N. Y. S. 514 (1927), says, "The relationship between insurer and insured on
marine insurance is one which calls for nberrima fides." Further, Delaware In-
surance Co. v. 'Hill, 127 S. W. 283 (Tex. 1910) is to the effect that a valued
policy will be absolutely void if there is misrepresentation of value, provided
there is actual fraud, or such a gross misstatement of value that fraud may be
presumed. Also, see Tyrie v. Fletcher, 2 Comp. 666, 98 Reprint 1297 (Eng.
1777) ; Stevenson v. Snow, 3 Burr. 1240, 97 Reprint 809 (Eng. 1761) ; Martin v.
Sitwell, 1 Shower 156, 89 Reprint 509 (Eng. 1700) ; Colby v. Hunter, 3 C. & P. 7,
172 Reprint 298 (Eng. 1827).
However, see, supra, n. 2. And also to the contrary is the one case most
directly in point, Morrison v. The Universal Marine Insurance Co., 8 Exch. 197(Eng. 1873). Plaintiff-insured's agent was instructed to secure marine insurance
on freight on the Cambria. The agent had been informed that the Cambria might
be grounded, there being some news to that effect. Upon careful investigation
the agent determined that the ship had not grounded, whereupon he applied for
the policy, not mentioning the supposedly false rumor. The insurer heard of
the rumor from another source shortly after receiving the application, but issued
the policy notwithstanding. Upon suit on the policy (the Cambria having in fact
been grounded and lost) held, the failure of the agent to mention the rumor made
the policy voidable at the option of the insurer. This option could be exercised
within a reasonable time after the insurer learns that it has cause to avoid.
Held, also, that the insurer's issuing the policy after hearing of the unconfirmed
rumor did not amount to an election not to avoid.
Also, see 38 CoRPus JuRis, MARINE INSURANCE (1921) §139; and 4 RICH-
ARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed 1932) §136.
" 13 East 323, 104 Reprint 394 (Eng. 1811).
8, 5 B. & Ad. 651, 110 Reprint 931 (Eng. 1833).
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the policies were "valued," the value would be "reopened," and the
insurer could show that the amount stated in the policy was not the true
amount on board ship at the time of the disaster at sea. In those cases
the boat owner insured his freight charge (Forbes case) and cargo
(Rickman case) before picking up the cargo, which then turned out to
be considerably smaller than anticipated. A loss at sea occurred. It
was held that the insurer had to pay, in the former case, freight charges
equivalent only to the actual charge that would have been due on the
smaller cargo, and, in the latter case, only the value of the actual
cargo.35* I
The case of The-Main;86 extended this doctrine by allowing the
insured a return of the extra premium that had been paid for the un-
necessary overinsurance. In this case, a ship operator took out in-
surance to make sure that he received his freight charge (which he
otherwise would not receive in case of a loss at sea). Before he set
sail, however, the owner of the cargo unexpectedly paid the ship
operator about one fourth of the freight charge, so that there ceased to
be any risk at all that such part of the charge would not be received.
A loss at sea occurred. The court held that the insurer was liable only
for the remainder of the freight charge, and also that the insured could
recover the excess premiums.37 * Also, in Fisk v. Masterman8 there
was overinsurance because of a mistake in good faith as to the size and
value of the cargo. Return of appropriate premium was allowedao*
New York has adopted for all types of property insurance cases the
"'The Forbes and Rickman cases conform to the general rule that the valua-
tion in a valued policy may be reopened where there is fraud or mistake; but
beyond this it may not be reopened, not even where there is only a par'tial loss.
Griswold v. Union Insurance Co., 11 Fed. Cas. 69, No. 5840 (C. C. N. Y. 1854);
Brooke v. Louisiana Insurance Co., 4 Mant. N. S. (La.) 640 (1826) ; Stanton v.
Natchez Insurance Co., 6 Miss. 340 (1844). See Hall v. Jefferson Insurance Co.,
279 Fed. 892 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Nome
Beach Lighterage, 133 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); Muirhead v. Forth In-
surance Assoc., 1894 A. C. (Eng.) 72.
(1894) Prob. (Eng.) 320.
'" Despite the liberality of this case in allowing a return of the premium for
overinsurance caused by unexpected payment of freight, it strongly criticized the
Forbes case, supra, for recognizing any overinsurance in the case where, in a
valued policy, the parties had merely mistaken the size of the cargo. The Main
case stated that a court was not at liberty to reopen the valuation agreed upon
by the parties as an arbitrary and unchangeable figure. As to the merit of dis-
tinguishing between overvaluation caused by unexpected payment of the freight
charge and that caused by mistake as to the value of the cargo, query. See dis-
cussion of Fisk v. Masterman, supra.
38 8 M. & W. 165, 151 Reprint 994 (Eng. 1841).
'"When the voyage began, there was no overinsprance. But while the ship
was on the high seas additional insurance was secured with another company, on
a mistaken belief that the cargo was of greater value than it actually was. Held,
only the second insurance company must return excess premiums to the insured;
for the first insurer bore the entire risk for at least a part of the voyage, so is
not liable for returning a ratable share of the premium paid for overinsurance.
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wise custom of refusing to consider a valued policy void when there
is an innocent overvaluation; but instead, that state merely sets aside
the stated value, and awards recovery on the policy to the insured on
the basis of a smaller and more accurate valuation. 40  This in effect
converts a valued policy into an open one, except that the valuation
has to be calculated, in such a case, by reference back to the time the
policy was taken out, rather than as of the time the loss occurred. Also,
Ohio has adopted a statute requiring every fire insurer to have an agent
appraise the value of the property at the time the policy is renewed ;41
and under such a statute of course a misstatement of value by the in-
sured would not be held to avoid the policy.42
Finally, regardless of whether or not the insurer exercised his
option to void the policy, it would appear that there was such a mistake
here that the insured himself should be allowed to avoid it. As stated
by the Restatement of Contracts,4 3 * ". . . where parties on entering
into a transaction that affects their contractual relations are both under
a mistake regarding a fact assumed by them as the basis on which they
entered into the transaction, it is voidable by either party if enforce-
ment of it would be materially more onerous to him than it would have
been had the fact been as the parties believed it to be . . .,,44* (with
o Huth v. New York Insurance Co., 21 N. Y. Super. Ct. 538, 8 Bos. 538
(1861).
"6 OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1937) §9583. The effect of this statute is to
make all five policies, which are renewed, valued policies. Originally the statute
applied to original issues as well as renewals.
112 Queens Insurance Co. v. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409, 24 N. E. 1072 (1890).
' RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAc'rs (1932) §502. This section begins by stating
that it shall be applicable notwithstanding the fact that there is no such mistake
as would render the original offer void, or render the contract void as ambiguous,
or render the contract void because of impossibility not foreseen or reasonably
foreseeable by the promisor.
" This section of the Restatement is in accord with the general case law.
Relief for mistake (cancellation, rescission, reformation, etc.) is allowed where
there is a mistake going "to the essence" of the subject matter of a contract.
Fritzler v. Robinson, 70 Iowa 500, 31 N. W. 61 (1886); Hecht v. Batheller,
147 Mass. 335, 17 N. E. 651 (1888) ; McKay v. Coleman, 85 Mich. 60, 48 N. W.
203 (1891); Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N. W. 919 (1887); Costello
v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 172 N. W. 907 (1919) ; Du Pont Chemical Co. v. Buck-
ley, 96 N. J. Eq. 465, 126 Atl. 674 (1924); McCaull-Webster Co. v. Steele
Brothers, 43 S. D. 485, 180 N. W. 782 (1921).
Relief is also generally allowed where there was a mistake in counting, or
other mathematical computation. Miller v. First Savings Bank, 90 Cal. App.
387, 266 Pac. 294 (1928); Freeman v. Ralph Realty Corp., 198 App. Div. 788,
191 N. Y. S. 72 (1921); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (2nd ed. 1938) §1574, n. 1;
Annotation: 59 A. L. R. at 825, 830.
Relief is frequently denied where it would result in placing the defendant in a
worse position than he was in originally-as, for instance, where he has per-
formed services or entered into contractual obligations which he otherwise would
not have undertaken, on the assumption that he was rightfully entitled to the
assets which the plaintiff seeks to recover from him. Grymes v. Saunders, 93
U. S. 55, 23 L. ed. 798 (1876); Olson v. Shephard, 165 Minn. 433, 206 N. W.
711 (1926) ; Harper v. Newburgh, 159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59 (1913):
Murray v. Saunderson, 62 Wash. 477, 114 Pac. 424 (1911).
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three exceptions not applicable here) .4 " All of the requisites for the
application of this section are present in the principal case: (1) The
mistaken fact was the basis on which the parties bargained. It was a
material mistake affecting the identity and attributes of the subject
matter of the contract.46  (2) The mistake was harmful to the insured
to the extent of over $2,000.47 (3) The insured is willing to pay
premiums on the true ($61.50) value of the necklace. (This require-
ment is generally a condition precedent to relief for mistake.) 48
However, the contention of the insurer in this case is that to judge
the case on the established rules concerning return of premiums and
void policies is to beg the entire question, for this case contains, says
the Orient Insurance Company, a special equity which makes the estab-
lished law inapplicable-namely, that regardless of legal theories, the
insurance company did actually, as a practical matter, bear a risk here-
for if the insured property were at the bottom of the ocean, then the
insurance company could never prove, save perhaps by sending divers
to the bottom, that the pearls were worth only $60.00 instead of
$60,000. Hence the Orient Company says it is entitled to a premium
commensurate with the $60,000 risk borne.
It would seem that the present case is incorrect in allowing this
contention of the insurer to control the decision. No reason is shown
why the insurer could not have obtained the second protocol from Ger-
many-the one subsequently obtained by the insurer, in which the
German commissioner admitted his original mistake in stating the
value of the pearls, and restated their true value at $61.50. And not
even this would have been necessary if there had been a disaster in
which the pearls were merely partially lost, or crushed, or otherwise
damaged, but not sunk. In short, this present case is no different from
any other in which owners take out marine insurance that their goods
in distant parts of the world will be safely transported. 40 * Every in-
surer, and in fact every litigant, must run the risk of not being able to
find evidence to prove his defenses.
Although this was a valued policy, the insurer could not very well
'*The second exception is where the party seeking to avoid the transaction
can obtain satisfaction by reformation. See, supra, pp. 93 f., to the effect that this
exception would not apply here.
" See RESTATEMENT, CoNmAcrs (1932) §502, comment a.
," Id., comment b. "Id., comment c.
'" For example, see the Forbes, Rickman, Mah, and Fisk cases, supra.
If the Orient Insurance Co. was seeking to change the existing law, would
the following line of argument have been more effective? The owner of property
generally has, even in cases such as the present, a better chance of obtaining,
and more likelihood of knowing, the value of the protected property than the
insurer, who in practically every case has never had any dealings with such
property before-so that the policy of the courts should be to make the owner
bear the loss caused by overvaluation, where the property is in a distant country,
and not available for inspection.
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contend, in the face of the Forbes and Rickman cases, that he could not
"reopen" the value so as to offer his evidence that the pearls were of
lesser value. MILTON SHORT.
Taxation-Powers of Appointment-Will Contests-Taxation
of Property Passing under Compromise of Attempted
Testamentary Exercise of Power of Appointment
Decedent, Zachary Smith Reynolds, died at the age of twenty,
being at that time the beneficiary of three trusts set up by the deed
and wills of his parents. One trust directed that he receive the income
until he reached 28 years of age, at which time he became outright owner;
from the other trusts he was to receive income for life. All three
trusts gave him a general testamentary power of appointment over the
trust property whereby he could, in his sole discretion, appoint to any-
one. In default of exercise of the power, the property was to go to
his descendants, or if he had none, to his brother and sisters and their
issue per stirpes. Decedent's attempt to exercise the power in favor
of his brother and sisters by a New York will was contested by his two
children who (1) denied the validity of the New York will and, (2)
challenging the right of the brother and sisters to take in default,
asserted their own right to do so. The brother and sisters claimed
under decedent's will and in the alternative as takers in default, con-
tending that one child was precluded because of a prior separation
agreement and the other by reason of illegitimacy. These issues were
never finally resolved by judicial decision, and eventually a compromise
was entered into under which 37312% of the trust property went to
the brother and sisters. In a 5 to 4 decision'" the Supreme Court de-
l* Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, - U. S. -,
62 S. Ct. 925, 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 851 (1942). Both the majority and minority
agreed that if the power of appointment were unexercised decedent did not have
such an interest in the trust property as to require its inclusion in his gross estate
under §302(a). This conclusion was based upon the legislative history of the
statute and upon implicationg from United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct.
256, 65 L. ed. 617 (1921), rather than upon the economic equivalence of decedent's
rights to complete ownership. Thus the court refused to expand the scope of
§302(a) by the concept of "sibstantial ownership" which is developing under§22(ay for income tax purposes. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
(1942) §4.12, p. 223. Except for the unavailability of the corpus, the ordinary life
estate coupled with a general power of appointment closely resembles a fee simple.
For this reason, the inclusion of such property under §302(a), even though the
power be unexercised, would perhaps have been not unreasonable, especially inas-
much as by so doing the court, at one stroke, could have escaped the complicated
question of apportionment raised by their actual decision, and also laid at rest any
possible doubt concerning the constitutionality of the taxation under the 1942
Revenue Act of property subject to an unexercised power of appointment. See
Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company (1941-1943) C. C. H. Inheritance
Tax Service-State, 190, 530 (Ky. 1942), where the court at the end of its
opinion expresses doubts as to the ability of the legislature to tax property subject
to an unexercised power as a part of the donee's estate.
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cided that such part of this share as the brother and sisters received
because of their claim as appointees under decedent's will should be
included in decedent's gross estate for the purpose of computing the
Federal Estate Tax under §302(f) providing for the inclusion of prop-
erty passing by the exercise of a general power of appointment.
2
*
Prior to the passage of the 1942 Federal Revenue Act,3 this de-
cision represented perhaps as good a solution as was possible to an
extremely complicated and troublesome problem. It had been settled
that property subject to an unexercised power of appointment was not
includible in decedent's gross estate under §302(f) before the 1942
Amendment.4  Property subject to a general power of appointment was
includible under §302(f) if the power was exercised and the property
passed pursuant to this exercise.3 Even where a general power was
validly exercised appointees under it, who were also takers in default
under the will of the donor of the power, could exempt the projerty
from the tax by electing to take in default rather than as appointees,
the property being considered as not having passed.0 The question in-
volved in the instant case is how much, if any, of property subject to
a general power of appointment is to be considered as coming within
the scope of §302(f) so as to be includible in decedent's estate for the
purpose of the levy of the Federal Estate Tax, where an attempt has
been made to exercise the power, and the validity of this attempt has
never reached judicial decision but a compromise agreement gives the
attempted appointees some part at least of what they would have taken
as such.
Three possibilities are conceivable here: (1) to include none of the
property; (2) to include only part of the property; or (3) to include all
of the property. The four dissenting judges in the instant case took
2* Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 STAT. 9; 26 U. S. C. A. §811 (1940) : "§302.
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible, wherever situated-(f) (as amended by §803, Revenue Act of 1932, c.
209, 47 STAT. 169) To the extent of any property passing under a general power
of appointment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death, or (3) by deed under which he has retained for his life or any'period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death (A) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or (B) the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth."
'Federal Revenue Act of 1942, tit. IV, Part I, §403 a-f (1-2).
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935);
Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estates Tax (1939) 52 HARV.
L. Rxv. 929; 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942), c. 9.
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
'Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
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the position that none of the property should be included, on the assump-
tion that the attempted exercise of the power was invalid ;7 hence any-
thing which the brother and sisters took came to them because of their
claim as takers in default and was thus outside the scope of §302(f).
These judges regarded Helvering z. Grinnells as supporting this point
of view, and indicated that the doctrine of Lyeth v. Hoey0 had no
application since in the instant case a state court had said that no prop-
erty had passed by the exercise of the 'power. Furthermore, they felt
that the task of calculating the relative weight of the conflicting claims
so as to determine what part of the brother's and sisters' share came
to them through the bargaining force of the attempted exercise of the
power and what part did not was virtually impossible.
The majority decided that some part of the share going to the
brother and sisters under the compromise was attributable to the
attempted exercise of the power in decedent's will and should therefore
be included in decedent's gross estate under §302(f). This result was
reached by applying the reasoning of Lyeth v. Hoey'0 in which prop-
erty received by an heir under a compromise settlement of his contest
of his ancestor's will was held to be property taken "by inheritance"
and hence not taxable as income, the rationale being that the taxation
of property distributed in compliance with the terms of a compromise
depends upon the factors which influenced the compromise. The court
indicated that the invalidity of the attempted exercise of the power had
never been carried to -final judicial decision and that it was a sub-
stantial factor in the compromise which was eventually reached,,- while
the alternative claim of the brother and sisters as takers in default was
extremely tenuous. Although this conclusion seems reasonable, it in-
jects into every case of this character the tremendously complicated
issue of the relative effect of conflicting claims upon a compromise.
The majority felt, however, that the difficulty of evaluation should not
prevent taxation in accordance with the realities of the compromise.
12
Although rejected by both the majority and minority of the court,
the conclusion of the Tax Commissioner that all of the property should
be included seems about as sensible as saying that none of it should be.
Assuming that the validity of neither claim has reached judicial decision,
the argument is that the brother's and sisters' alternative claim as takers
in default was so tenuous as to have played no part in determining their
'Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).
8294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. ed. 825 (1935).
p305 U. S. 196, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 125, 119 A. L:R. 410 (1934).
10305 U. S. 196, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 125, 119 A. L. R. 410 (1934).
"1 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935).
"2 Cf. United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 47 S. Ct. 608, 71 L. ed. 1054
(1926).
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share under the compromise, and that such share was entirely due to
their claim as appointees under decedent's will.
The 1942 Federal Revenue Act'"* amends §302(f) by providing
for the inclusion in decedent's gross estate of any property with respect
to which decedent has at the time of his death a general power of
appointment. Thus the tax is made to fall in accordance with the
shifting of economic benefit rather than according to strict property
rules under which it is determined whether any property passed through
the exercise of a general power. One effect of this amendment is the
future elimination under the Federal Estate Tax of the type of prob-
lem in the instant case where a will purporting to exercise a power of
appointment has been compromised. Since the requisite for inclusion
under §302(f) is now the mere existence of the power in decedent at
the time of his death, all the property subject to the power would be
included. The question whether any part of a compromise share is
attributable to the attempted exercise of a general power of appoint-
ment and the necessity for the calculation of the relative weight of con-
flicting claims are no longer present.
An analogous problem exists under state law. A provision ex-
pressly imposing the Inheritance Tax upon property in accordance with
compromises reached in will contests 14* was eliminated from the Rev-
enue Act of North Carolina in 1941.45 Evidently this change was
prompted by fear of the difficulties inherent in the situation of the
principal case, and a desire to have the tax levied in accordance with
the state of the probate records,'0 a result which has been reached
under similar statutes in a majority of states passing on the question.17
The particular problem of the taxability of property subject to a
power of appointment where an attempt to exercise the power by will
1"Federal Revenue Act of 1942, tit. IV, Part I, §403 a-f (1-2): "§403.
Powers of Appointment. (a) General rule-§811 (f) is amended to read as fol-
lows: (f) Powers of Appointment-(I) In general-To the extent of any prop-
erty (A) with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his death a power
of appointment. . . ." This statute also provides for the taxation of property sub-ject to special powers of appointment.
'* N. C. PuB. L. 1937, c. 127, §1 First, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§7880(1), First. "§1: A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of
any property, real or personal, or of any interest therein or income therefrom,
in trust or otherwise, to persons or corporations, in the following cases: First.
When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this state from any
person dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of the state; or
when the transfer is by settlement, contract or agreement, or by any court order
or otherwise, to any person or persons, by reason of claim or claims arising by
virtue of intestate laws, in controversies or contests as to the probate or con-
struction of any will or wills, or any trust or other instrument executed or created
by any person dying seized-of the property while a resident of this state."
11 Inheritance and Estate Tax Laws of North Carolina, Schedule A-Revenue
Act of 1939 as amended by the General Assembly of 1941, Art. I, Schedule A,
Inheritance Tax, §1 First and Second.
11 19 N. C. L. REv. at p. 526 (1941). ' See Note (1932) 78 A. L. R?. 716.
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has resulted in compromise, is not affected by this change since the
North Carolina Inheritance Tax Law contains a provisioni s* similar
to the 1942 Federal Law whereby property subject to an unexercised
power of appointment is taxed as though the power had been exercised.
Hence whether property is to be taxed according to the terms of the
compromise or the state of the probate records, any part of it which
was subject to a power of appointment, exercised or not, would be taxed.
Nevertheless, since the North Carolina law imposes an inheritance
tax upon property subject to a power of appointment at a rate deter-
mined by the relationship of the recipient of the property to the donor
of the power,19 greater opportunities for obtaining lower rates are open
to the well-advised individual or institution under the present rule of
taxing according to the state of the probate records than under the
rule that the inheritance tax is to be levied in accordance with com-
promises in will contests. For example, property passing to strangers
is taxed at a higher rate than property passing to relatives.20  A power
of appointment is exercised by will in favor of a stranger to the donor
of the power. A son of the donor who is a taker in default contests
the will. The parties can then agree that the will shall not be probated
with the result that the property goes by default to the son who then
pays an agreed share to the proponent of the will. Under the rule
of taxation according to the state of the probate records, all of the
property will then be taxed at the rate imposed upon sons of donors,
in spite of the fact that part of it actually went to a stranger who is
taxed at a higher rate. However, under the rule of taxation according
to the compromise, the property going to each party would be taxed at
the correct rate.21 *
"*N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1), Fifth. "Whenever any per-
son or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any dis-
position of property made either before or after the passage of this law, such
appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions
of this law in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment
relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed
or devised by such donee by will, and the rate shall be determined by.the relation-
ship between the beneficiary under the power and the donor; and whenever any
person or corporation possessing such power of appointment so derived shall
omit or fail to exercise the same within the time provided therefor, in whole or
in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this law shall be deemed to
take place to the extent of such omission or failure in the same manner as though
the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoy-
ment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by a
will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the
time of such omission or failure."
"s See note 18 supra.
'ON. C. 'CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(3-5).
" See Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 295, 149 S. E. 321 (1929) ; Note (1929)
CoL. L. Rav. 1164. 'However, the usual result under this rule would be to keep
the property in lower brackets because the tax would then be levied after the
property had been split up according to the compromise.
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An examination of the Estate and Inheritance Tax Laws of other
states indicates a considerable variety of provisions for the taxation of
property subject to powers of appointment. These statutes fall into
three principal categories: (1) those which, like North Carolina, im-
pose a tax upon property subject to a power of appointment not only
where the power is exercised but also where there has been an omission
or failure to exercise it, (2) those which tax only property which is
transferred through the exercise of a power, and (3) those in which no
specific reference is made to powers of appointment.
Twenty states impose a tax upon both the exercise and non-exercise
of a power of appointment. Nineteen of these states22 have an identical
statute. North Carolina and Florida, however, further provide that the
rate of taxation shall be determined by the relationship of the benefi-
ciary under the power to the .donor, and the Kentucky statute contains
a proviso that the transfer shall be deemed to take place at the time of
the death of the donor and that the assessment shall be made at that
time.23 Rhode Island specifically taxes property subject to either a
"general or limited" power. North Dakota,24 in somewhat different
language, taxes transfers of property subject to both exercised and un-
exercised powers, but as of the estate of the -donor, not the donee, of
the power.
The statutes of thirteen states25 tax only property which is trans-
ferred through the exercise of a power of appointment, and no tax is
specifically imposed in the event of non-exercise. The statutes of Del-
22 Colorado, COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 85, §12; District of Columbia,
D. C. CODE (1940) §47-1601(j); Florida, FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skill-
man, Supp., 1936) §1342(10) ; Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §14-402; Kansas,
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp., 1941) §79-1520; Kentucky, Ky. STAT.
ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §4281a-14; Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933), c. 65,§2; Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1941) §7.561, Fourth; Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §2292(5); Missouri, Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §571;
Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) §10400.1(5);
New Mexico, N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1929) §141-1118; North Carolina,
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(1), Fifth; Ohio, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1939) §5332(4) ; Rhode Island, R. I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 43, §§1, 4(3)
17, Acts of R. I. (1939), c. 664, §§1, 4(3), 18, p. 161; South Carolina, S. C. CODE(1932) §2480(d); South Dakota, S. D. CODE (1939) §57.2104; West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §842(e); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. (1941)§72.01 (5).
2 See note 18 .supra.2 Laws of N. D. (1933) c. 251, §2(5), p. 374.
"5Arizona, ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §40-105(5); Arkansas, ARK. DxG. STAT.
(Pope, 1937) §14001(8) ; California, CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8495
§2(6); Delaware, DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §135; Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1934) c. 120, §375(4); Iowa, IOWA CODE (1939) §7307; Mississippi, Miss.
CODE ANN. (Supp., 1938) §1678(d); New Jersey, N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940)
54:34-1, d. (2), 54:36-4; New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New
York, TAx LAW §220(4); Pennsylvania, PENN. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.,
1942) tit. 72, §2301(d); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §1260;
Texas, TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 7117; Washington,
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §11201-c.
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aware, Illinois, New York, and Washington are couched in identical
language; New York and Washington, however, providing further that,
if at the time an appointment takes effect the 'donor of the power was a
resident and the donee was a non-resident, the appointed property shall
be taxable as having been transferred in the estate of the donor. Penn-
sylvania and Tennessee tax all property passing by the exercise of
powers of appointment as of the estate of the donor of the power rather
than that of the donee. The language of the Arizona and Mississippi
statutes is identical with that of the Federal law26 under which the
principal case was decided. California regards the gift of a power of
appointment as a taxable transfer from &lonor to donee at the date of
donor's death, and provides that where the donor died before the taking
effect of the statute that the subsequent exercise of the power shall be a
taxable transfer.
The Inheritance, Estate, Transfer, or Succession Tax Laws of
fifteen states27 do not specifically mention the taxation of property sub-
ject to powers of appointment. Connecticut, Maryland, Oklahoma, and
Virginia refer, however, to certain powers reserved in one who dis-
poses of his property. Nevada28 has no Inheritance, Estate, Transfer,
or Succession Tax.
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.
See note 2 supra.
17Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) tit. 51, §432; Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. (Supp., 1939) §395e; Georgia, GA. CODE (1933) §92-3401; Indiana,
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §6-2401; Louisiana, LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart,
1939) §§8556-8587; Maine, ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 77, §2; Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) Art. 81, §111, Laws of Md. of 1941, c. 790, §1; Nebraska,
NEB. COMP. STAT. (Supp., 1941) §77-2201; New Hampshire, N. H. PuB. L. (1926)
c. 72; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 68, §989e; Oregon, ORE. Comtp.
LAws ANN. (1940) §§20-101 to 20-156; Utah, UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933)
§80-12; Vermont, VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) §§1047-1122; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1936) Appx. Tax Code, §§98-120, TAx CODE (1942) §§98-120; Wyoming,
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1931) §§115-1201 to 115-1232.
11 Nay. Comip. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929).
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